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Abstract 
 
It is often presumed that Gini coefficient values taken to reflect high 
income inequality are largely due to some combination of socioeconomic 
factors that gives rise to inequality of opportunities. We demonstrate, using 
computer simulations, that practically every Gini value within the entire range 
observed in state economies can be approximated by at least one of a set of 
possible models of an economy in which earning is totally due to random 
factors. Although that clearly does not prove that opportunities are in reality 
fairly equal, it does suggest that inequality of opportunities is not necessary 
for high income inequality. At the least, it relegates the burden of proof to 
whoever ascribes the latter largely to the former.  
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Economists use the Lorenz curve, obtained by plotting cumulative 
percentage of household income (or wealth1) as a function of percentile of 
income (see Figure 1), to display inequality in distribution of income within a 
given economy, as well as to compare between different economies the 
extents of within-economy inequality (see Cowell, 2000; Jenkins & van Kerm, 
2009; Schnitzer, 1974).  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                ------------------------------------- 
More formally, the Lorenz curve is a function, F, associating cumulative 
income (by definition, non-negative) with percentiles. Its derivative function, f, 
namely the one associating with each percentile its own total income, is by 
definition monotonically increasing.   
Let the value of f for any percentile, i, be denoted fi, and let the value of 
F for any percentile, i, be denoted Fi.  
By definition, for each i>1, 
     fi-1   <   fi     .                                                                            (1) 
Also, by definition, for each i>1, 
     Fi = Σj=1,I  fj   =  Σj=1,I-1 fj   +  fi  = Fi-1  +  fi       .                              (2) 
 Hence, for each i>2,  
     Fi = Fi-1  +  fi      and    Fi-1 = Fi-2  +  fi-1         .                                              (3)                          
 By (1) and (3),  
     Fi-1 - Fi-2   <  Fi  - Fi-1       .                                                                                    (4)     
Thus, that Lorenz curves are practically always convex is hardly an 
empirical phenomenon. Such a curve would coincide with the line of perfect 
equality only in the extremely unlikely case that incomes were allocated by fiat 
uniformly between households, irrespective of any characteristic or 
consideration, which does not happen even in the most egalitarian societies 
(with the possible exception of some small communes like old-time kibbutzim 
in Israel). Barring that extreme case, the convexity of the Lorenz curve is 
actually entailed by its definition.  
 
The Attribution fallacy  
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Since the Lorenz curve is almost necessarily convex, it is the degree of 
convexity that indicates the extent of inequality. The departure of the Lorenz 
curve from the line of perfect equality is typically measured by the Gini 
coefficient. That measure (see Dalton, 1920) is defined as the ratio of the area 
between the line of perfect equality and the observed Lorenz curve to the area 
between the line of perfect equality and the line of perfect inequality, which 
turns out to equal a half of the mean of absolute differences across all pairs of 
incomes (Sen, 1997/1973, pp. 30-31).  
Although the Gini coefficient relates just to inequality of incomes (or of 
wealth) per se, it is considered quite prevalently as a general measure of 
economic inequality (see Sen, 1997, for a critical commentary). When applied 
to plotting the distribution of assets, it might also be interpreted as a measure 
of social inequality (see, e.g., Wikipedia entry "Lorenz curve", 2013), which 
appears to reflect a presumption that inequality of financial resources is due to 
inequality of opportunities, namely to inequality in social circumstances 
essential for the opportunity to obtain the resources. That presumption should 
easily be identified as an instance of the fallacy known as affirming the 
consequent: The fact that inequality of opportunities often results in inequality 
of assets or incomes does not at all imply that any inequality of those sorts 
must be attributed to inequality of oppurtunities. 
A further well-known, if not widespread, belief is that free market 
economies are inherently biased in favor of the rich, mainly because the 
opportunity to earn income depends much on the preceding state of income 
and assets, which by Marxist theory (see Schnitzer, 1974, pp. 14-17), in the 
case of employers is affected mostly by surplus value, while in the case of 
employees is limited to the more meager labor income. Consequently, much 
like stated in Karl Marx' “General law of capitalist accumulation" (Marx, 
1965/1867), the capital get increasingly concentrated and centralized (see, 
e.g., Bauman, 2009; Krugman, 2006).  
Do indeed “the rich get richer”, as Scott Fitzgerald’s maxim has it? That 
must be true to some extent (see review in Björklund & Jäntti, 2009), 
especially if assets are entirely inherited to offsprings (see results of 
simulation in Epstein & Axtel, 1996), but probably not to the same extent that 
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critics of free market economy believe (see, e.g., Lebergott, 1976; Tomes, 
1981).  
Anyhow, deductions about socioeconomic sources of the allocation of 
income, which in turn might have had some impact on sociological theories 
and political movements, do not squarely follow from the convexity of Lorenz 
curves. The Lorenz curve in itself is not very informative about social or 
economic factors to which the income distribution is due. It certainly is quite 
mute about equality of opportunities. Maintaining that it nonetheless does 
reflect unequal opportunities to a considerable extent must be due to a kind of 
attribution fallacy, derived from the false belief that if opportunities were equal, 
income inequality would be negligible. 
To realize in a reasonably compelling manner that such a belief is 
indeed false, it is useful to inspect imaginary allocation processes that 
guarantee equal opportunities, namely that do not discriminate between 
individuals by any given property or prior condition. For one, opportunities 
may be equal when incomes are granted to persons by a fair lottery.  
 
Simple instances of totally random allocation processes 
Case a: Incomes from a fixed set are raffled.  This condition is met 
whenever  incomes in any sort of a known distribution are assigned  to 
persons by means of a random procedure. Consider, for example, a discrete 
uniform income distribution. A conceivable generating process for such as a 
distribution may be a fair lottery in which M persons are allocated at random 
to R income levels with j (=M/R) receivers each (or, with some heavier role of 
chance, a fair lottery in which each of the M persons has an equal probability 
of gaining any of the R income levels). Since the process is random, it gives 
each person a-priori an equal probability to receive each of the alternative 
income levels. Nonetheless, the Lorenz curve would clearly be considerably 
convex, because despite the egalitarian process, the outcome is far from 
being egalitarian. The obvious reason is that income inequality is imposed by 
the nature of the process: Income is ordained to vary to a known extent, 
though everybody is equally likely to earn any income level. Thus, though 
opportunities are not unequal, incomes by definition are. 
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That process, however, is clearly of quite limited interest, since it does 
not generate an income distribution by some sort of known economic process 
that distributes total incoming total resources or redistributes existing ones, 
rather maps a fixed set of incomes to an equal-size set of persons. That 
administrative procedure that leaves the distribution intact is obviously not an 
economic process in any customary sense.  
Case b: A number of equal-prize lotteries are administered.  Now 
consider a more interesting a-priori egalitarian process, one that does not 
ordain the extent of inequality, and furthermore does not preclude emergence 
of equality: Allocating randomly a total sum S (say, $1,000,000) to a given 
number of persons, M, (say, 1,000), by means of N (where M  N) 
independent lotteries in each of which a single person wins exactly 1/N of the 
total sum. It is a-priori egalitarian, because everybody starts with 0, has an 
equal chance to receive the first drawn prize, and then an equal chance, 
irrespective of previously allocated prizes, to receive any further drawn prize. 
That could account for generating some of the variance in income, though it 
certainly cannot realistically generate all of it.   
To model the process, note its similarity to a case of succesive runs of 
a simple experiment having more than two possible results, like spinning a 
four-sided spinning top (dreidel). The probability, for a composite experiment 
with N succesive spins, of any specific quadruple of occurrence frequencies of 
each result, xi, is given by the multinomial rule: 
       (N! /( x1! x2! x3! x4!)) · 1/4
N    . 
Allocating money to M persons by N independent lotteries is analogous 
to recording the results of N spins of an M-faced spinning top. Thus, the 
probability of any specific allocation (namely, M-tuple of number of prizes won 
by each person, xi) is given by the multinomial rule: 
      (N! / (x1! x2! …… xM!)) · 1/M
N    . 
The entire set of consequences of applying that composite experiment 
to any pair of M and N, for any possible M-tuple, can be mapped onto (a) 
frequency distributions specifying the likelihood for any possible of the M 
persons to end up with 0, 1, 2, etc prizes, (b) frequency distributions 
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specifying the likelihood for any set of M-tuples sharing the same partition 
(e.g., (2,1,1), (1,2,1) and (1,1,2)).  
To illustrate, in the case of 3 lotteries and 3 possible winners, there are  
10 possible allocation results: (3,0,0), (2,1,0), (2,0,1), (1,2,0), (1,0,2), (1,1,1), 
(0,2,1), (0,1,2), (0,3,0), (0,0,3), with the following respective likelihoods: 1/27, 
3/27, 3/27, 3/27,  3/27, 6/27, 3/27, 3/27, 1/27, 1/27. For any possible winner, 
the Binomial likelihoods of ending up with 0, 1, 2 or 3 prizes are 8/27, 12/27, 
6/27, 1/27, respectively. As for frequency distributions, as seen above there 
are three types of them: (a) 3 permutations of (3,0,0), (b) 6 permutations of 
(2,1,0), (c) one permutation of one prize to each. Their respective likelihoods 
are 3/27, 18/27, 6/27. 
Similarly, in the case of 4 lotteries and 3 possible winners, the Binomial 
likelihoods of ending up with 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 prizes are 16/81, 32/81, 24/81, 
8/81, 1/81, respectively. As for frequency distributions, there are four types of 
them: (a) 3 permutations of (4,0,0), (b) 6 permutations of (3,1,0), (c) 3 
permutations of (2,2,0), (d) 3 permutations of (2,1,1), with respective 
likelihoods of 3/81, 24/81, 18/81, 36/81. 
Consider now the somewhat more interesting case of N=10 and M=10. 
The number of disribution types is too large to report all likelihoods. Suffice it 
to say that the likelihood of complete equality is .0004, and that when 
distributions are arranged lexicographically, the median one is 
(3,2,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,0), which yields a Gini coefficient of .36.  
Since calculating by analytic formulae for larger parameter values  
turned out to be infeasible due to combinatorial explosion, we opted for 
averaging estimates made by computer simulation. 
We varied both M (namely, number of persons in the population) and 
N/M (namely, lotteries per person), conducted for each combination 100 
independent allocations, then averaged statisti of the distributions. The mean 
Gini coefficients for each of those combinations is presented in Table 1A. The 
family of averaged Lorenz curves for all three N/M values used and M=10000 
is displayed in Figure 2. Note that the outcome is far from producing an equal 
distribution: For M=10000 (which seems to be about the start of the 
asymptote), the mean Gini coefficient was found to be ~.28 when N/M is 4 
(see Table 1A), and ~.80 when N/M is 0.25.  
 8 
Of course, with large enough N/M the distribution would tend to 
equality, which directly follows from the Bernoulli theorem. It is possible to 
regard that consequence of the Bernoulli theorem as implying that inequality 
cannot in practice be due to a random allocation process. On the other hand, 
it is not clear that the number of lotteries within a time frame used to measure 
income is actually large enough to render inequality negligible.  
The concept of lotteries is actually metaphorical, of course: It is meant 
to stand for fortuitous events each providing some opportunity of considerably 
improving somebody’s lot. Is it clear that the number of such events within the 
relevant time frame must be more than 4-fold of the number of possible 
winners? Just to illustrate, imagine we record the yearly household income in 
a village by the sea, most inhabitants of which find their living by fishing, each 
using his own small boat. The daily yield per fisherman is regularly pretty 
meager, but with luck he would catch a really huge fish that he could sell for a 
very high sum of money. Is it probable that the average number of such lucky 
occasions in a year exceeds 4 (meaning, of course, that the total number of 
such events across all M fishermen is 4M)? It seems that even 1 is an 
overestimate. At least, N/M=1 definitely cannot be ruled out.  
Anyhow, note that the results in Table 1A are just a first approximation, 
subject to the assumption that all prizes are equal, made for the sake of 
simplicity.  
When we relaxed the assumption of a uniform prize - not sufficiently 
realistic even for an utterly simplistic process like the one simulated here, and 
varied prize magnitude (.1/N .5/N, 1/N, 1.5/N, 1.9/N of the total sum S, with 
even probabilities) for M=10000 the mean Gini coefficient was found to be 
~.33 when N/M is 4 (see Table 1B), and ~.86 when N/M is 0.25.  
When prize magnitude was varied with a skewed set of probabilites 
(.41, .27, .17, .10, .05, for prize magnitudes 0.488/N, 0.740/N, 1.176/N, 2/N, 
4/N of the total sum S, respectively), for M=10000 the mean Gini coefficient 
was found to be ~.35 when N/M is 4 (see Table 1C). and ~.86 when N/M is 
0.25.  
We further relaxed another assumption - that there is only one winner 
in any given lottery. We rather introduced, in addition to variable prize 
magnitude, the tenet that the prize of a lottery is split equally between a 
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random number of co-winners (drawn, for simplicity, from a discrete uniform 
distribution with the range 1-4). In that case, for M=10000 the mean Gini 
coefficient was found to be somewhat smaller,~.26, when N/M is 4 (see Table 
1D), and ~.75 when N/M is 0.25. 
In sum, over the four versions of the model, the minimal mean Gini 
coefficient at asymptote ranges between ~.26 and ~.35, the maximal one 
ranges between ~.75 and ~.83, and the medium one ranges between ~.47 
and ~.63. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 2 about here 
                                ------------------------------------- 
Catch-as-catch-can allocation processes 
           A shared feature of the allocation processes described above is that on 
each allocation event the gain is won by an extremely small subset of the 
population, typically one person, and at most four. Another feature is that 
even when the amount of gain, its probability, and/or number of winners are 
variable across events, any of those parameters is definite for each given 
event.  
            Let us now consider another type of random allocation process that 
though ensuring also equal opportunity to all population members, is much 
less systematic in its terms of allocation. Before formally defining it, let us 
illustrate it by an incident that fits that definition: Imagine that an armored car, 
used for transferring large amounts of money notes, crashes, all the notes in it 
scatter on the road, and passers-by rush to pick the notes as much as any of 
them can. Theoretically, each member of the population could attend such an 
incident, thereby able to share the loot. However, clearly quite a limited 
number of them happen to actually be there. In addition, the portion of the loot 
grabbed by any of the passers-by is indefinite, since after a particular note is 
taken by person i, any of the passers-by, including i herself, may take any of 
the yet untaken notes. Furthermore, the amount of notes taken by each of the 
passers-by depends not only on chance but also on some access parameters 
(e.g., proximity, physical abilities etc).   
          This illustration should of course not taken to mean that any CACC 
process is illegal. It may include, for example, a case in which a number of 
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people, each separately, find on the beach a school of great fish thrown to the 
shore during a heavy storm.  
In our simulation of CACC allocation processes, we varied M (number 
of persons in the population), N/M (ratio of number of lotteries and number of 
persons in the population) and m (number of participants in any particular 
process), conducted for each combination 100 independent allocations, then 
averaged statisti of the distributions. The mean Gini coefficients for each of 
those combinations is presented in Table 2. Note that the outcome, much like 
the outcome of national lotteries, is far from producing an equal distribution. 
As can be seen, the mean Gini coefficient at asymptote (M=10000) ranges 
between ~.04 and ~.75. It might be reasonably argued that the high values of 
N/M (namely, those in which the number of such events equals or even 
exceeds the number of population members) are very implausible, hence the 
plausible range is actually between ~.22 and ~.75.   
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                             ------------------------------------- 
In addition, we conducted a simulation of an augmented version of 
CACC, in which access of participants to the notes was not uniform: 20% of 
them were 4 times as likely to grab notes as were other participants. The 
mean Gini coefficients for each of those combinations is presented in Table 3.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                             ------------------------------------- 
As can be seen, the mean Gini coefficient at asymptote (M=10000) in 
that case is somewhat higher: The plausible range is between ~.25 and ~.81.  
Finally, we conducted a simulation of a case in which income is 
determined both by equal-prize lotteries and allocation processes of the 
augmented version of CACC type, in which access of participants to the notes 
was not uniform: 20% of them were 4 times as likely to grab notes as were 
other participants. The mean Gini coefficients for each of the comninations of 
that conjoint allocation regime, only at asymptote (namely M=10000) is 
presented in Table 4.  
        ------------------------------------- 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                   ------------------------------------- 
As can be seen, the mean Gini coefficient at asymptote for the 
plausible value of N/M ranges in that case between .41 and .48.  
 
Effort-dependent random earning 
Clearly, not all incomes can be attributed to luck in winning, without 
investing much effort, a good that in any given event is unsplittable (or 
minimaly splittable), or a number of such goods. In the bulk of occasions of 
income earning, the latter must be due to pedestrian labor rewarded 
modestly. The next step was to include that chunk of income - regular 
earnings - in the model.  
The regular earnings may result from a constant source that may vary 
in existence and magnitude between individuals (e.g., salary, rent), quite often 
sufficiently to give rise to substantial income inequality. However, since we 
were interested in the highly random constituent of regular earnings, we 
modeled only a process in which the weekly haul is an aggregate of minimally 
small gains. We postulated, for the sake of simplicity, the conservative 
premise that all earners do exactly the same for living, including parameter 
values. We further postulated a moderately high likelihood of gaining any of 
the small gains in a unit time that is small enough to enable gaining no more 
than one in it (such as is the time needed for re-aiming in hunting birds by 
slingshot). In our model, we set that likelihood to .05, varied gain size G (.5, 
.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5) with the same probability p (.01) for each gain size value. We 
operationally defined haul to be the sum of gains in L time units of work in a 
week. Its magnitude depends on the size of the particular gain on any unit 
time, hence haul magnitude distribution is multinomial.  
We simulated the model with two possible values of L (200, 2000), then 
calculated the Gini values of yearly income (namely, across 52 weeks). Table 
5 presents mean Gini values (over 100 replications) of yearly regular random 
earnings under all combinations of L and M. As can be seen, the mean Gini 
value at asymptote ranges between ~.01 and ~.03, much smaller than it is 
expected to be when income is due to rare chance events. Yet, of course, the 
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values would be higher, if the postulate of perfect equality (between earners) 
in the parameters of the earning process was relaxed.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
                                ------------------------------------- 
Finally, we tested cases in which total income over the whole period 
represented in a Lorenz curve (say, a year) is a sum of the three components 
presented above: (a) chance of winning a fast-&-large gain – the yearly 
cumulative gain in N ordinary lotteries, as described above, (b) chance of 
winning a fast-&-moderate catch-as-catch-can loot – the yearly cummulative 
gain in all catch-as-catch-can lotteries, as described above, (c) regular 
earnings – the sum of 52 values of weekly income due to routine work, each 
sampled from the same distribution.  
We calculated Gini values in economies that have all three, but to 
enable inspecting the effects of various weights of the three sources, we 
added two other parameters – specifying ratio of expected prize in ordinary, 
equal-prize (EP, for short) lotteries, if won, to mean yearly income (5, 10, 50, 
100), or ratio of expected loot in catch-as-catch-can (CACC, for short) lotteries 
to mean yearly income (1, 10, 100). The mean Gini values, only for M=10000, 
are presented in Table 6, as a function of ratio of prize in EP lottery to mean 
yearly income, ratio of prize in CACC lottery to mean yearly income, number 
of lotteries per person in each of the two types of lotteries, as well as number 
of time units of work per week in regular earnings.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
                                ------------------------------------- 
It is noteworthy that in any of the conjunctions of possible earning 
sources, there is at least one combination of parameter values that yields a 
considerable (>.39) mean Gini value. The greater the ratio, with respect to 
mean regular earnings, of the prizes of lotteries, the larger is that maximal 
mean Gini value. Yet, especially effective is the ratio between the prize of 
equal-prize lottery and mean regular earnings. Furthermore, when the latter 
prize is ≥10, it acts to reverse the effect of the corresponding ratio in CACC 
lotteries. For example, when the ratios of the prize of the equal-size lottery 
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and the prize of the CACC lottery to mean regular earnings are 100 and 1 
respectively, maximal mean Gini value is quite substantial - almost .72.  
Thus, it would seem unsafe to attribute to social, or to any sort of non-
random, factors (much less, exclusively) almost any empirical Gini value of 
those yearly calculated for countries, were it considered reasonable that their 
economies were affected by anything akin to the random allocation 
processes, aside of regular earning, discussed above. How reasonable is that 
actually? This issue is discussed below. 
  
Are those models instructive?           
 How relevant are the above models to the economic process by which 
goods are distributed between members of a community?  
The mini-models underlying the simulations above were not of course 
conceived to model an economy, much less the economy of a modern 
country. They are rather meant to examine how much inequality could be 
produced in a regime in which capital is allocated only by random processes, 
which may be used as a sort of baseline inequality for allocations emerging in 
real economies that are evidently manyfold more complex. 
On the other hand, the greater the number of variables added to 
characterize the random allocation, the closer it comes to a model that traces 
the outline of an economy in which chance plays a major role. The model 
might appear to be a caricature of an economy as we now know it. Evidently, 
present economies do not work that way as a rule, though some part of the 
variance of household income must be accounted for by fortuitous discoveries 
or fairly unique events such as inception of bright ideas bearing extraordinarily 
large economic fruit.  
Still, note that very primitive economies, such as ones that existed in 
stone-age, or even bronze-age, communities, may presumably not be 
extremely different from that caricature. The stone age hunter must have 
depended much on his good luck – sometimes a deer, more often a rabbit, 
quite often nothing at all. Whenever he had some luck in hunting, its 
contribution to the household welfare was probably much greater than the 
less fortuitous, yet much smaller, contributions of the gatherers in his family.   
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Anyhow, it is instructive that in a world in which economies worked that 
way, considerable inequality would be observed, and the variation of 
inequality between economies would be due just to variability of M and N 
(regardless of the total sum of money being distributed!). Conceivably, 
whatever factors actually produce inequality, or modulate it, in present-day 
economies mimic in some yet-unknown way the simple random processes 
described above, at least in their effects. If real values of N/M, as well as of 
other parameters, were within the range that produces substantial inequality 
in our model (which there seems to be no way to ascertain, since their model 
definitions are very hard to operationalize), then inequality would seem to be 
due largely to natural causes rather than just to sociopolitical structures.  
Note, augmenting the models discussed above with sources of 
variation that are not due to mere chance (e.g., innate individual differences 
known to affect earning capacity) would not necessarily reduce Gini values, 
possibly even increase them. All that is not meant to argue that income 
inequality is mostly due to chance. Yet, it may be enough for shifting the 
burden of proof to advocates of the stance that it is considerably due to 
sociopolitical factors.  
That does not mean of course that inequality is an inevitable evil, let 
alone a justified phenomenon, neither that there is little to be done to reduce 
it. However, realizing how liable inequality is to emerge, even without the 
structures characetristic of modern, free-market economies, makes one 
somewhat skeptic of attributing it to any of the latter.  
Take, for example, the premise of concentration of capital due to the 
propensity of earning opportunity to grow with the extent of assets being 
already held. Since the models simulated here could produce ample inequality 
in spite of being predicated on absolutely equal opportunities throughout the 
process, one may ponder about the validity of that premise, and at least 
require very good direct evidence that a considerable chunk of inequality is 
due to concentration of capital.  
Possibly, opportunities are not as unequal in our economy as often 
believed. But even if they are considerably unequal, some sociopolitical 
factors in a good deal of modern economies (e.g., progressive taxes, welfare 
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policy, common laud of donations to charity, etc.) must be potent enough to 
compensate for the impact of that inequality.  
Either way, it would seem that "the law of Nature" is not more 
egalitarian than are most economic regimes, capitalism included. More 
probably, compassionate liberalism mitigates them both (see Piketty & Saez, 
2003, 2006): Low levels of inequality are present mostly in states that 
effectively apply measures resulting in income redistribution (e.g., Sweden, 
Denmark). Inequality is higher in countries in which the government does less 
in that respect (e.g., Thailand, United States).  
The fact that inequality is particularly high in countries in which central 
rule is very weak or practically nonexistent (e.g., Haiti, Sierra Leone3 provides 
strong evidence of the cardinal role of institutional intervention in curtailing 
inequality. That indicates that inequality is probably not the product of 
institutional subjugation of some primitive natural order, as Marxist thought 
suggests, rather a quite likely outcome within an environment in which 
individuals seek income independently with minimal cooperation or central 
intervention.                
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Footnotes 
 
1. Below we omit any mentioning of wealth or assets. Everywhere the 
word “income” is mentioned, the argument applies to wealth as well.                            
  
2. Similarly, only a relative poverty rate that is higher than the one 
generated by random procedures like those may be regarded as 
reflecting inherent socioeconomic bias. Typically, an index of 
relative poverty rate is measured as the proportion of households 
with an income less than a given percentage, say 50%, of the 
median income. Note that an index defined in that way is sensitive 
to how income is distributed among low income households, which 
may be quite weakly related with how it is distributed among 
households with above-median income. More important, any rise in 
the median that is due to some beneficial factor not shared by many 
low income households (e.g., reducing income tax, salary raise for 
all public sector workers) is bound to effectuate some increase in 
the poverty rate index.  
 
3. At least, by the time this paper is written. 
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Table 1: Gini Values for Equal-Prize Lottery 
 
1a: With equal gain 
  
 Number of lotteries per 
person 
Size of 
population 
0.25 1 4 
400 0.798 0.522 0.274 
2,000 0.800 0.525 0.278 
10,000 0.801 0.524 0.277 
50,000 0.801 0.524 0.277 
 
1b: With varying gains 
 
 Number of lotteries per 
person 
Size of 
population 
0.25 1 4 
400 0.860 0.615 0.331 
2,000 0.862 0.616 0.332 
10,000 0.863 0.618 0.333 
50,000 0.863 0.617 0.333 
 
1c: With varying gains with varying 
probabilities 
 
 Number of lotteries per 
person 
Size of 
population 
0.25 1 4 
400 0.857 0.623 0.352 
2,000 0.862 0.627 0.353 
10,000 0.863 0.628 0.354 
50,000 0.863 0.627 0.354 
 
1d: With varying gains and varying 
probabilities for 1-4 
 
 Number of lotteries per 
person 
Size of 
population 
0.25 1 4 
400 0.743 0.468 0.255 
2,000 0.750 0.472 0.256 
10,000 0.750 0.473 0.256 
50,000 0.749 0.474 0.256 
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Table 2: Gini Values for "Catch as catch can" 
 
    Size of population   
 
400 2,000 10,000 50,000 
Group 
size 
Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 
10 
0.04 0.744 0.04 0.750 0.04 0.751 0.04 0.751 
0.2 0.402 0.2 0.408 0.2 0.409 0.2 0.409 
1.0 0.180 1.0 0.184 1.0 0.186 1.0 0.186 
5.0 0.080 5.0 0.083 5.0 0.083 5.0 0.083 
         
50 
0.04 0.449 0.04 0.466 0.04 0.469 0.04 0.469 
0.2 0.203 0.2 0.214 0.2 0.216 0.2 0.216 
1.0 0.091 1.0 0.096 1.0 0.097 1.0 0.097 
5.0 0.039 5.0 0.043 5.0 0.043 5.0 0.044 
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Table 3: Gini Values for modified "Catch as catch can" 
 
    Size of population   
 
400 2,000 10,000 50,000 
Group 
size 
Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 Number 
of  
lotteries 
per 
person 
 
10 
0.04 0.802 0.04 0.807 0.04 0.808 0.04 0.808 
0.2 0.481 0.2 0.485 0.2 0.487 0.2 0.487 
1.0 0.222 1.0 0.226 1.0 0.227 1.0 0.227 
5.0 0.098 5.0 0.102 5.0 0.102 5.0 0.102 
         
50 
0.04 0.513 0.04 0.529 0.04 0.532 0.04 0.532 
0.2 0.242 0.2 0.250 0.2 0.252 0.2 0.252 
1.0 0.108 1.0 0.113 1.0 0.14 1.0 0.114 
5.0 0.047 5.0 0.050 5.0 0.051 5.0 0.051 
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Table 4: Gini Values for modified "Catch as catch can"(CACC)+"Equal Prize lottery"(EP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Weight of CACC vs. EP   
Number of 
lotteries 
per person 
1 10 100  
0.25 0.476 0.413 0.437  
1 0.268 0.212 0.225  
4 0.141 0.107 0.113  
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Table 5: Gini Values for random regular earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Number of lotteries  
Size of 
population 
200 2000 
400 0.023 0.006 
2,000 0.025 0.008 
10,000 0.026 0.008 
50,000 0.026 0.008 
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Table 6: Gini Values for combination of all 3 models of earnings 
 
Ratio of 
EP prize 
to mean 
yearly 
income 
 
Ratio of CACC prize to mean yearly income 
1 10 100 
  
Number of lotteries per person in each of the two types 
 0.25 1 4  0.25 1 4  0.25 1 4 
L (Time units of 
work in regular 
earnings) 
           
5 
200 .389 .341 .206  .334 .211 .113  .408 .215 .109 
2000 .388 .340 .205 .334 .211 .113 .408 .216 .109 
          
10 
200 .509 .395 .228 .397 .255 .139 .399 .210 .106 
2000 .508 .395 .228 .397 .255 .139 .398 .210 .106 
          
50 
200 .683 .455 .250 .607 .390 .213 .413 .224 .115 
2000 .684 .456 .250 .607 .391 .213 .412 .224 .115 
          
100 
200 .715 .464 .253 .670 .427 .232 .467 .266 .141 
2000 .715 .464 .253 .670 .427 .232 .467 .267 .140 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1.    An illustration of a family of Lorenz curves, each plotting 
                  cumulative percentage of household income as a function of 
                  percentile of income (the diagonal represents the locus of 
                  complete equality). 
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